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ABSTRACT
Deploying deep reinforcement learning in safety-critical settings requires developing algorithms that
obey hard constraints during exploration. This paper contributes a first approach toward enforcing
formal safety constraints on end-to-end policies with visual inputs. Our approach draws on recent
advances in object detection and automated reasoning for hybrid dynamical systems. The approach is
evaluated on a novel benchmark that emphasizes the challenge of safely exploring in the presence of
hard constraints. Our benchmark draws from several proposed problem sets for safe learning and
includes problems that emphasize challenges such as reward signals that are not aligned with safety
constraints. On each of these benchmark problems, our algorithm completely avoids unsafe behavior
while remaining competitive at optimizing for as much reward as is safe. We also prove that our
method of enforcing the safety constraints preserves all safe policies from the original environment.
1 Introduction
Deep reinforcement learning algorithms (Sutton & Barto, 1998) are effective at learning, often from raw sensor inputs,
control policies that optimize for a quantitative reward signal. Learning these policies can require experiencing millions
of unsafe actions. Even if a safe policy is finally learned – which will happen only if the reward signal reflects all
relevant safety priorities – providing a purely statistical guarantee that the optimal policy is safe requires an unrealistic
amount of training data (Kalra & Paddock, 2016). The difficulty of establishing the safety of these algorithms makes it
difficult to justify the use of reinforcement learning in safety-critical domains where industry standards demand strong
evidence of safety prior to deployment (ISO-26262, 2011).
Formal verification provides a rigorous way of establishing safety for traditional control systems (Clarke et al., 2018).
The problem of providing formal guarantees in RL is called formally constrained reinforcement learning (FCRL).
Existing FCRL methods such as (Hasanbeig et al., 2018a,b; Hasanbeig et al., 2019; Hasanbeig et al., 2020; Hahn et al.,
2019; Alshiekh et al., 2018; Fulton & Platzer, 2018; Phan et al., 2019; De Giacomo et al., 2019) combine the best of
both worlds: they optimize for a reward function while safely exploring the environment.
Existing FCRL methods suffer from two significant disadvantages that detract from their real-world applicability: a)
they enforce constraints over a completely symbolic state space that is assumed to be noiseless (e.g. the position
of the safety-relevant objects are extracted from a simulator’s internal state); b) they assume that the entire reward
structure depends upon the same symbolic state-space used to enforce formal constraints. The first assumption limits
the applicability of FCRL in real-world settings where the system’s state must be inferred by an imperfect and perhaps
even untrusted perception system. The second assumption implies a richer symbolic state that includes a symbolic
representation of the reward, which we argue is unnecessary and may require more labelled data. Furthermore, this
means these approaches may not generalize across different environments that have similar safety concerns, but
completely different reward structures.
The goal of this paper is to safely learn a safe policy without assuming a perfect oracle that identifies the positions of all
safety-relevant objects. I.e., unlike all existing FCRL methods, we do not rely on the internal state of the simulator.
Prior to reinforcement learning, we train an object detection system to extract the positions of safety-relevant objects
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up to a certain precision. The pre-trained object detection system is used during reinforcement learning to extract the
positions of safety-relevant objects, and that information is then used to enforce formal safety constraints. Absolute
safety in the presence of untrusted perception is epistemologically challenging, but our formal safety constraints do at
least account for a type of noise commonly found in object detection systems. Finally, although our system (called
Verifiably Safe Reinforcement Learning, or VSRL) uses a few labeled data to pre-train the object detection, we still
learn an end-to-end policy that may leverage the entire visual observation for reward optimization.
Prior work from the formal methods community has demonstrated that you can do safe RL when you have full symbolic
characterization of the environment and you can precisely observe the entire state. However, this is not realistic for
actual robotic systems which have to interact with the physical world and can only perceive it through an imperfect
visual system. This paper demonstrates that techniques inspired by formal methods can provide value even in this
situation. First, we show that by using existing vision techniques to bridge between the visual input and the symbolic
representation, one can leverage formal techniques to achieve highly robust behavior. Second, we prove that under
weak assumptions on this vision system, the new approach will safely converge to an optimal safe policy.
Our convergence result is the first of its kind for formally constrained reinforcement learning. Existing FCRL algorithms
provide convergence guarantees only for an MDP that is defined over high-level symbolic features that are extracted
from the internal state of a simulator. Instead, we establish optimality for policies that are learned from the low-level
feature space (i.e., images). We prove that our method is capable of optimizing for reward even when significant
aspects of the reward structure are not extracted as high-level features used for safety checking. Our experiments
demonstrate that VSRL is capable of optimize for reward structure related to objects whose positions we do not extract
via supervised training. This is significant because it means that VSRL needs pre-trained object detectors only objects
that are safety-relevant.
Finally, we provide a novel benchmark suite for Safe Exploration in Reinforcement Learning that includes both
environments where the reward signal is aligned with the safety objectives and environments where the reward-optimal
policy is unsafe. Our motivation for the latter is that assuming reward-optimal policies respect hard safety constraints
neglects one of the fundamental challenges of Safe RL: preventing “reward-hacking”. For example, it fundamentally
difficult to tune a reward signal so that it has the “correct” trade-off between a pedestrian’s life and battery efficiency.
We show that in the environments where the reward-optimal policy is safe (“reward-aligned”), VSRL learns a safe
policy with convergence rates and final rewards which are competitive or even superior to the baseline method.
More importantly, VSRL learns these policie with zero safety violations during training; i.e., it achieves perfectly
safe exploration. In the environments where the reward-optimal policy is unsafe (“reward-misaligned”), VSRL both
effectively optimizes for the subset of reward that can be achieved without violating safety constraints and successfully
avoids “reward-hacking” by violating safety constraints.
Summarily, this paper contributes: (1) VSRL, a new approach toward formally constrained reinforcement learning
that does not make unrealistic assumptions about oracle access to symbolic features. This approach requires minimal
supervision before reinforcement learning begins and explores safely while remaining competitive at optimizing for
reward. (2) Theorems establishing that VSRL learns safely and maintains convergence properties of any underlying
deep RL algorithm within the set of safe policies. (3) A novel benchmark suite for Safe Exploration in Reinforcement
Learning that includes both properly specified and mis-specified reward signals.
2 Problem Definition
A reinforcement learning (RL) system can be represented as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) (S,A, T,R, γ) which
includes a (possibly infinite) set S of system states, an action space A, a transition function T (s, a, s′) which specifies
the probability of the next system state being s′ after the agent executes action a at state s, a reward function R(s, a)
that gives the reward for taking action a in state s, and a discount factor 0 < γ < 1 that indicates the system preference
to earn reward as fast as possible. We denote the set of initial states as Sinit ⊆ S.
In our setting, S are images and we are given a safety specification safe : O → {0, 1} over a set of high-level
observations O, specifically, the positions (planar coordinates) of the safety-relevant objects in a 2D or 3D space. Since
S 6= O, it is not trivial to learn a safe policy pi such that safe(O) = 1 along every trajectory. We decompose this
challenge into two well-formed and tractable sub-problems:
1. Pre-training a system ψ : S → O that converts the visual inputs into symbolic states using synthetic data
(without acting in the environment);
2. Learning policies over the visual input space S while enforcing safety in the symbolic state space O.
This problem is not solvable without making some assumptions, so here we focus on the following:
2
Verifiably Safe Exploration for End-to-End Reinforcement Learning
Assumption 1. The symbolic mapping ψ is correct up to . More precisely, the true position of every object oi can be
extracted from the image s through the object detector ψ(s)i so that the Euclidean distance between the actual and
extracted positions is at most , i.e. ∀i ||ψ(s)i − oi||2 ≤ . We assume that we know an upper bound on the number of
objects whose positions are extracted.
Assumption 2. Initial states, described by a set of properties denoted as init, are safe, i.e. ∀s ∈ Sinit :
safe(ψ(s)) = 1 . Moreover, every state we reach after taking only safe actions has at least one available safe
action.
Assumption 3. We are given a dynamical model of the safety-relevant dynamics in the environment, given as either
a discrete-time dynamical system or a system of ordinary differential equations, denoted as plant. We assume that
model is correct up to simulation; i.e., if T (si, a, sj) 6= 0 for some action a, then the dynamical system plant maps
ψ(si) to a set of states that includes ψ(sj).
For example, the model may be a system of ODEs that describes how the acceleration and angle impact the future
positions of a robot, as well as the potential dynamical behavior of some hazards in the environment. Note that this
model only operates on O (the symbolic state space), not S (low-level features such as images or LiDAR).
Assumption 4. We have an abstract model of the agent’s behavior, denoted as ctrl, that is correct up to simulation:
if T (si, a, sj) 6= 0 for some action a, then ψ(sj) is one of the possible next states after a(ψ(si)) by ctrl.
An abstract model of the agent’s behavior describes at a high-level a safe controller behavior, disregarding the fine-
grained details an actual controller needs to be efficient. An example is a model that brakes if it is too close to a hazard
and can have any other type of behavior otherwise. Note that ctrl is very different from a safe policy pi, since it only
models the safety-related aspects of pi without considering reward optimization.
Assumptions 1-4 are mild and reasonable for most practical systems to satisfy.
3 Background
The goal of an RL agent represented as an MDP (S,A, T,R, γ) is to find a policy pi that maximizes its expected total
reward from an initial state s0 ∈ Sinit :
V pi(s) , Epi
[∑∞
i=0
γiri)
]
(1)
where ri is the reward at step i. In a deep RL setting, we can use the DNN parameters θ to parametrize pi(a|s; θ).
One particularly effective implementation and extension of this idea is proximal policy optimization (PPO), which
improves sample efficiency and stability by sampling data in batches and then optimizing a surrogate objective function
that prevents overly large policy updates (Schulman et al., 2017). This enables end-to-end learning through gradient
descent which significantly reduces the dependency of the learning task on refined domain knowledge. Deep RL thus
provides a key advantage over traditional approaches which were bottle-necked by a manual, time-consuming, and
often incomplete feature engineering process.
To ensure formal guarantees we use differential Dynamic Logic (dL) (Platzer, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2017), a logic for
specifying and proving reachability properties of hybrid dynamical systems, which combine both discrete-time (e.g. a
robot that decides actions at discrete times) and continuous-time dynamics (e.g. an ODE describing the position of
the robot at any time). Hybrid systems can be described with hybrid programs (HPs), for which we give an informal
definition in Table ??. Notably, besides the familiar program syntax, HPs are able to represent a non-deterministic
choice between two programs α ∪ β, and a continuous evolution of a system of ODEs for an arbitrary amount of time,
given a domain constraint F on the state space {x′1 = θ1, ..., x′n = θn & F}.
Formulas of dL are generated by the following grammar where α ranges over HPs:
ϕ,ψ ::= f ∼ g | ϕ ∧ ψ | ϕ ∨ ψ | ϕ→ ψ | ∀x.ϕ | ∃x.ϕ | [α]ϕ
where f, g are polynomials over the state variables, φ and ψ are formulas of the state variables, ∼ is one of {≤, <,=
, >,≥}. The formula [α]ϕ means that a formula ϕ is true in every state that can be reached by executing the hybrid
program α.
Given a set of initial conditions init for the initial states, a discrete-time controller ctrl representing the abstract
behaviour of the agent, a continuous-time system of ODEs plant representing the environment and a safety property
safe we define the safety preservation problem as verifying that the following holds:
init→ [{ctrl;plant}∗]safe (2)
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Intuitively, this formula means that if the system starts in an intial state that satisfies init, takes one of the (possibly
infinite) set of control choices described by ctrl, and then follows the system of ordinary differential equations
described by plant, then the system will always remain in states where safe is true.
Example 1 (Hello, World). Consider a 1D point-mass x that must avoid colliding with a static obstacle (o) and has
perception error bounded by 2 . The following dL model characterizes an infinite set controllers that are all safe, in the
sense that x 6= o for all forward time and at every point throughout the entire flow of the ODE:
init→ [{ctrl; t := 0;plant}∗]x− o > 
where, SB(a) ≡ 2B(x− o− ) > v2 + (a+B) ∗ (aT 2 + 2Tv))
init ≡ SB(−B) ∧B > 0 ∧ T > 0A > 0 ∧ v ≥ 0 ∧  > 0
ctrl ≡ a := ∗; ?−B ≤ a ≤ A ∧ SB(a)
plant ≡ {x′ = v, v′ = a, t′ = 1&t ≤ T ∧ v ≥ 0}
Starting from any state that satisifies the formula init, the (abstract/non-deterministic) controller chooses any
acceleration satisfying the SB constraint. After choosing any a that satisfies SB, the system then follows the flow
of the system of ODEs in plant for any positive amount of time t less than T . The constraint v ≥ 0 simply means
that braking (i.e., choosing a negative acceleration) can braing the pointmass to a stop, but cannot cause it to move
backwards.
The full formula says that no matter how many times we execute the controller and then follow the flow of the ODEs, it
will always be the case – again, for an infinite set of permissible controllers – that x− o < .
Theorems of dL can be automatically proven in the KeYmaera X theorem prover (Fulton et al., 2015, 2017). (Mitsch
& Platzer, 2016) explains how to synthesize action space guards from non-deterministic specifications of controllers
(ctrl), and Fulton & Platzer (2018, 2019) explains how these action space guards are incorporated into reinofrcement
learning to esnure safe exploration. Additional details about how we synthesize monitoring conditions from dL models
is available in (Mitsch & Platzer, 2016) and in Appendix A.
4 VSRL: Verifiably Safe RL on Visual Inputs
We present VSRL, a framework that can augment any deep RL algorithm to perform safe exploration on visual inputs.
As discussed in Section 2, we decompose the general problem in two tasks:
1. learning a mapping of visual inputs s into a symbolic state o for safety-relevant properties using only a few
examples (described in Section 4.1 and shown in Figure 1a);
2. learning policies over visual inputs, while enforcing safety in the symbolic state space (described in Section 4.2
and shown in Figure 1c).
This latter task requires a controller monitor, which is a function ϕ : O ×A→ {0, 1} that classifies each action a in
each symbolic state o as “safe” or not. In this paper this monitor is synthesized and verified offline following (Fulton
& Platzer, 2018, 2019). In particular, as discussed in the previous sections, the KeYmaera X theorem prover solves
the safety preservation problem presented in Eq. (2) for a set of high-level reward-agnostic safety properties safe,
a system of differential equations characterizing the relevant subset of environmental dynamics plant, an abstract
description of a safe controller ctrl and a set of initial conditions init (shown in Figure 1b).
4.1 Object Detection
In order to remove the need to construct labelled datasets for each environment, we only assume that we are given a
small set of images of each safety-critical object and a set of background images (in practice, we use 1 image per object
and 1 background). We generate synthetic images by pasting the objects onto a background with different locations,
rotations, and other augmentations. We then train a CenterNet-style object detector (Zhou et al., 2019) which performs
multi-way classification for whether each pixel is the center of an object. For speed and due to the visual simplicity
of the environments, the feature extraction CNN is a truncated ResNet18 (He et al., 2016) which only keeps the first
residual block. The loss function is the modified focal loss (Lin et al., 2017) from Law & Deng (2018). See Appendix D
for full details on the object detector. Our current implementation does not optimize or dedicate hardware to the object
detector, so detection adds some run-time overhead for all environments. However, this is an implementation detail
rather than an actual limitation of the approach. There are many existing approaches that make it possible to run object
detectors quickly enough for real-time control.
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Environment wrapper
b) Offline verification and controller monitor synthesis 
KeYmaera
X
Safety Properties (safe):
dist(robot, hazard) > !
Model dynamics (plant)
robot.x’= robot.v * dx
robot.y’= robot.v * dy
robot.v’ = = ! * a;
…
Abstract controller behavior (ctrl)
?noreach(robot.x, hazard.x, 
robot.v) a || -B
…
a) Offline training of SOTA object detector
Random initial state s
Object 
detectionψ Symbolic state orobot.x = (11,4) hazard1.x = (3,10)hazard2.x = (7,10)…
Image state st
c) Safe exploration with controller monitor
0.6 0.1 0.2 0.1
P(at)
Substitute 
safe action Perform a’t
Controllermonitor
Object 
detectionψ
st+1, rt+1
Initial conditions (init)
robot.x > 0 
robot.v < B
….
Controllermonitor
Sample 
actionat
No
Symbolic state ot
robot.x = (11,4) 
hazard1.x = (3,10)
hazard2.x = (7,10)
…
Is at
safe?
Yes
Perform at
ot st+1, rt+1
Environment E
Figure 1: VSRL The left panels a) and b) represent offline pre-processing (described in Section 4.1) and verification.
The right panel c) shows how these components are used to safely explore, as described in Section 4.2.
4.2 Enforcing Constraints
While VSRL can augment any existing deep RL algorithm, this paper extends PPO (Schulman et al., 2015). The
algorithm performs RL as normal except that, whenever an action is attempted, the object detector and safety monitor
are first used to check if the action is safe. If not, a safe action is sampled uniformly at random from the safe actions in
the current state. This happens outside of the agent and can be seen as wrapping the environment with a safety check.
Pseudocode for performing this wrapping is in Algorithm 1. The controller monitor is extracted from a verified dL
model (see Page 3 of (Fulton & Platzer, 2018) for details). A full code listing that in-lines Algorithm 1 into a generic
RL algorithm is provided in Appendix E.
Algorithm 1 The VSRL safety guard.
Input: st: input image; at: input action; ψ: object detector; ϕ: controller monitor; E = (S,A, R, T ): MDP of the
original environment
a′t = at
if ¬ϕ(ψ(st), at) then
Sample substitute safe action a′t uniformly from {a ∈ A | ϕ(ψ(st), a)}
Return st+1 ∼ T (st, a′t, ·), rt+1 ∼ R(st, a′t)
4.3 Safety and Convergence Results
We establish two theoretical properties about VSRL. First, we show that VSRL safely explores. Second, we show that if
VSRL is used on top of an RL algorithm which converges (locally or globally) then VSRL will converge to the (locally
or globally) optimal safe policy. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Theorem 1. If Assumptions 1-4 hold along a trajectory s0, a0, s1, a1, . . . , an−1, sn with s0 ∈ Sinit for a model of the
environment plant and a model of the controller ctrl, where each ai is chosen based on Algorithm 1, then every
state along the trajectory is safe; i.e., ∀i ≥ 0,safe(ψ(si)).
This results implies that any RL agent augmented with Algorithm 1 is always safe during learning. Our second theorem
states that any RL agent that is able to learn an optimal policy in an environment E can be combined with Algorithm 1
to learn a reward-optimal safe policy.
Theorem 2. Let E be an environment and L a reinforcement learning algorithm.
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 2: Visualizations of evaluation environments. (a) XO environment (b) ACC environment (c) Goal-finding
environment (d) Pointmess environment
If L converges to a reward-optimal policy pi∗ in E, then using Algorithm 1 with L converges to pi∗s , the safe policy with
the highest reward (i.e. the reward-optimal safe policy).
5 Experimental Validation of VSRL
We evaluate VSRL on four environments: a discrete XO environment (Garnelo et al., 2016), an adaptive cruise control
environment (ACC), a 2D goal-finding environment similar to the Open AI Safety Gym Goal environment (Ray
et al., 2019) but without a MuJoCo dependency (GF), and a pointmesses environment that emphasizes the problem of
preventing reward hacking in safe exploration systems (PM). VSRL explores each environment without encountering
any unsafe states.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
Figure 3: Empirical evaluation of VSRL on all environments. All plots show the median and interquartile range of 4+ repeats.
The XO Environment is a simple setting introduced by (Garnelo et al., 2016) for demonstrating symbolic reinforce-
ment learning algorithms (the implementation by Garnelo et al. (2016) was unavailable, so we reimplemented this
environment). The XO environment, visualized in Figure 2(a), contains three types of objects: X objects that must be
collected (+1 reward), O objects that must be avoided (-1 reward), and the agent (marked by a +). There is also a small
penalty (-0.01) at each step to encourage rapid collection of all Xs and completion of the episode. This environment
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XO ACC GF PM
Method R U R U R U R U
PPO 10.5 7500 529 13983 0.233 3733 -0.25 3819
VSRL 10.5 0 967 0 0.228 0 -0.225 0
Table 1: Final reward (R; higher is better) and total number of unsafe actions (U; lower is better) on all environments.
All results are the median over at least 4 replicates.
provides a simple baseline for evaluating VSRL. It is also simple to modify and extend, which we use to evaluate the
ability of VSRL to generalize safe policies to environments that deviate slightly from implicit modeling assumptions.
The symbolic state space includes the position of the + and the O, but not the position of the Xs because they are not
safety-relevant. The purpose of this benchmark is to provide a benchmark for safe exploration in a simple discrete
setting.
The adaptive cruise control (ACC) environment has two objects: a follower and a leader. The follower must maintain a
fixed distance from the leader without either running into the leader or following too far behind. We use the verified
model from (Quesel et al., 2016) to constrain the agent’s dynamics.
The 2D goal-finding environment consists of an agent, a set of obstacles, and a goal state. The obstacles are the red
circles and the goal state is the green circle. The agent must navigate from its (random) starting position to the goal state
without encountering any of the obstacles. Unlike the OpenAI Safety Gym, the obstacles are hard safety constraints;
i.e., the episode ends if the agent hits a hazard. We use the verified model from (Mitsch et al., 2013) to constrain the
agent’s dynamics.
The 2D pointmesses environment consists of an agent, a set of obstacles, a goal state, and a set of pointmesses (blue Xs).
The agent receives reward for picking up the pointmesses, and the episode ends when the agent picks up all messes and
reaches the goal state. Unlike the 2D goal-finding environment, hitting an obstacle does not end the episode. Instead,
the obstacle is removed from the environment and a random number of new pointmesses spawn in its place. Notice that
this means that the agent may reward hack by taking an unsafe action (hitting an obstacle) and then cleaning up the
resulting pointmesses. We consider this the incorrect behavior. We use the verified model from (Mitsch et al., 2013) to
constrain the agent’s dynamics.
We compare VSRL to PPO using two metrics: the number of safety violations during training and the cumulative
reward. These results are summarized in Table 1. VSRL is able to perfectly preserve safety in all environments from the
beginning of training even with the -bounded errors in extracting the symbolic features from the images. In contrast,
vanilla PPO takes many unsafe actions while training and does not always converge to a policy that entirely avoids
unsafe objects by the end of training.
In some environments, preserving safety specifications also substantially improves sample efficiency and policy
performance early in the training process. In the ACC environment, in particular, it is very easy to learn a safe policy
which is reward-optimal. In the GF and PM environments, both the baseline agent and the VSRL agent struggle to learn
to perform the task well (note that these tasks are quite difficult because encountering an obstacle ends the episode).
However, VSRL remains safe without losing much reward relative to the amount of uncertainty in both policies. See
Appendix E for details on our experimental evaluation and implementation.
6 Related Work
Recently, there has been a growing interest in safe RL, especially in the context of safe exploration, where the agent
has to be safe also during training. A naive approach to RL safety is reward shaping, in which one defines a penalty
cost for unsafe actions. This approach has several drawbacks, e.g. the choice of the penalty is brittle, so a naive choice
may not outweight a shorter path to the reward, as shown by Dalal et al. (2018). Therefore, recent work on safe RL
addresses the challenge of providing reward-agnostic safety guarantees for deep RL (Garcıa & Ferna´ndez, 2015; Xiang
et al., 2018). Many recent safe exploration methods focus on safety guarantees that hold in expectation (e.g., (Schulman
et al., 2015; Achiam et al., 2017)) or with high probability (e.g., (Berkenkamp et al., 2017; Dalal et al., 2018; Koller
et al., 2018; Cheng et al., 2019). Some of these approaches achieve impressive results by drawing upon techniques from
control theory, such as Lyapunov functions (Berkenkamp et al., 2017) and control barrier certificates.
On the other hand, ensuring safety in expectation or with high probability is generally not sufficient in safety-critical
settings where guarantees must hold always, even for rare and measure-zero events. Numerical testing alone cannot
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provide such guarantees in practice (Kalra & Paddock, 2016) or even in theory (Platzer & Clarke, 2007). The problem
of providing formal guarantees in RL is called formally constrained reinforcement learning (FCRL). Existing FCRL
methods such as (Hasanbeig et al., 2018a,b; Hasanbeig et al., 2019; Hasanbeig et al., 2020; Hahn et al., 2019; Alshiekh
et al., 2018; Fulton & Platzer, 2018; Phan et al., 2019; De Giacomo et al., 2019) combine the best of both worlds:
they optimize for a reward function while still providing formal safety guarantees. While most FCRL method can
only ensure the safety in discrete-time environments known a priori, Fulton & Platzer (2018, 2019) introduce Justified
Speculative Control, which exploits Differential Dynamic Logic(Platzer, 2015) to prove the safety of hybrid systems,
systems that combine an agent’s discrete-time decisions with a continuous time dynamics of the system.
A major drawback of current FCRL methods is that they only learn control policies over handcrafted symbolic state
spaces. While many methods extract a symbolic mapping for RL from visual data, e.g. (Lyu et al., 2019; Yang et al.,
2018, 2019; Lu et al., 2018; Garnelo et al., 2016; Li et al., 2018; Liang & Boularias, 2018; Goel et al., 2018), they all
require that all of the reward-relevant features are explicitly represented in the symbolic space. As shown by the many
successes of Deep RL, e.g. (Mnih et al., 2013), handcrafted features often miss important signals hidden in the raw data.
Our approach aims at combining the best of FCRL and end-to-end RL to ensure that exploration is always safe with
formal guarantees, while allowing a deep RL algorithm to fully exploit the visual inputs for reward optimization.
7 Conclusion and Discussions
Safe exploration in the presence of hard safety constraints is a schallenging problem in reinforcement learning. We
contribute VSRL, an approach toward safe learning on visual inputs. Through theoretical analysis and experimental
evaluation, this paper establishes that VSRL maintains perfect safety during exploration while obtaining comparable
reward. Because VSRL separates safety-critical object detection from RL, next steps should include applying tools
from adversarial robustness to the object detectors used by VSRL.
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Supplementary material for: Verifiably Safe Exploration for End-to-End Reinforcement
Learning
A Model Monitoring
We use differential Dynamic Logic (dL) (Platzer, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2015, 2017) to specify safety constraints on the
agent’s action space. dL is a logic for specifying and proving reachability properties of both discrete and continuous
time dynamical systems.
In this section we expand on the definitions and provide some illustrative examples. In particular, we focus on the
language of hybrid programs (HPs), their reachability logic (dL), and monitor synthesis for dL formulas.
A.1 Hybrid Programs Overview
As shown succinctly in Table ??, hybrid programs are a simple programming language that combines imperative
programs with systems of differential equations. We expand the description from Table ?? and define the syntax and
informal semantics of HPs are as follows:
• α;β executes α and then executes β.
• α ∪ β executes either α or β nondeterministically.
• α∗ repeats α zero or more times nondeterministically.
• x := θ evaluates term θ and assigns result to x.
• x := ∗ assigns an arbitrary real value to x.
• {x′1 = θ1, ..., x′n = θn&F} is the continuous evolution of xi along the solution to the system constrained to a
domain defined by F .
• ?F aborts if formula F is not true.
Hybrid programs have a denotational semantics that defines, for reach program, the set of states that are reachable by
executing the program from an initial state. A state is an assignment of variables to values. For example, the denotation
of x := t in a state s is: Jx := tK(s)(v) = s(v) for v 6= xJx := tK(s)(x) = t
Composite programs are given meaning by their constituent parts. For example, the meaning of α ∪ β is:Jα ∪ βK(s) = JαK(s) ∪ JβK(s)
A full definition of the denotational semantics corresponding to the informal meanings given above is provided by
(Platzer, 2015).
A.2 Differential Dynamic Logic Overview
Formulas of dL are generated by the grammar:
ϕ,ψ ::= f ∼ g | ϕ ∧ ψ | ϕ ∨ ψ | ϕ→ ψ | ∀x, ϕ | ∃x, ϕ | [α]ϕ
where f, g are polynomials of real arithmetic, ∼ is one of {≤, <,=, >,≥}, and the meaning of [α]ϕ is that ϕ is true in
every state that can be reached by executing the program α. Formulas of dL can be stated and proven in the KeYmaera X
theorem prover (Fulton et al., 2015, 2017).
The meaning of a dL formula is given by a denotational semantics that specifies the set of states s ∈ S in which a
formula is true. For example, JtrueK = SJfalseK = ∅Jx = 1 ∧ y = 2K = {s ∈ S|s(x) = 1 and s(y) = 2}
We write |= ϕ as an alternative notation for the fact that ϕ is true in all states (i.e., JϕK = JtrueK). We denote by ` ϕ
the fact that there is a proof of ϕ in the proof calculus of dL.
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A.3 Using Safe Controller Specifications to Constrain Reinforcement Learning
Given a hybrid program and proven dL safety specification, Fulton & Platzer (2018) explains how to construct safety
monitors (which we also call safe actions filters in this paper) for reinforcement learning algorithms over a symbolic
state space. In this section, we summarize their algorithm.
As opposed to our approach, Fulton & Platzer (2018) employs both a controller monitor (that ensures the safety of the
controller) and a model monitor (that ensures the adherence of the model to the actual system and checks for model
mismatch).
The meaning of the controller monitor and model monitor are stated with respect to a specification with the syntactic
form P → [{ctrl; plant}∗]Q where P is a dL formula specifying initial conditions, plant is a dynamical system
expressed as a hybrid program that accurately encodes the dynamics of the environment, and Q is a post-condition.
(Fulton & Platzer, 2018) assumes that ctrl as the form ?P1; a1∪· · ·∪Pn; an, where ai are discrete assignment programs
that correspond to the action space of the RL agent. For example, an agent that can either accelerate or brake as action
space A = {A,−B}. The corresponding control program will be ?P1; a := A∪?P2; a := −B where P1 is a formula
characterizing when it is safe to accelerate and P2 is a formula characterizing when it is safe to brake.
Given such a formula, (Fulton & Platzer, 2018) defines the controller and model monitors using the following conditions:
Corollary 1 (Meaning of Controller Monitor). Suppose CM is a controller monitor for P → [{ctrl; plant}∗]Q and
s ∈ S and u : S → S. Then CM(u, s) implies (s, u(s)) ∈ JctrlK.
Corollary 2 (Meaning of Model Monitor). Suppose MM is a model monitor for init → [{ctrl; plant}∗]Q, that u
is a sequence of actions, and that s is a sequence of states. If MM(si−1, ui−1, si) for all i then si |= Q, and also
(si, ui(si)) ∈ JctrlK implies (ui(si), si+1) ∈ JplantK.
B Proof of Theorem 1
If the object detector produces an accurate mapping, then Algorithm 1 will preserve the safety constraint associated
with the ϕ monitor. We state this property formally in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 (Safety Theorem). Assume the following conditions hold along a trajectory s0, a0, . . . , sn with s0 ∈ Sinit:
A1 Initial states are safe: s ∈ Sinit implies ψ(s) |= init.
A2 The model and symbolic mapping are correct up to simulation: If T (si, a, sj) 6= 0 for some action a then
(ψ(si), a(ψ(si))) ∈ JctrlK and (ψ(si), ψ(sj)) ∈ JplantK.
Proof. We begin the proof by pointing out that our assumption about how
init→ [{ctrl; plant}∗]safe
was proven provides us with the following information about some formula J :
` init→ J (LI1)
` J → safe (LI2)
` J → [{ctrl; plant}∗]J (LI3)
Now, assume s0, a0, s1, a1, . . . , sn with s0 ∈ Sinit is a trajectory generated by running an RL agent with actions
selected by Algorithm 1 and proceed by induction on the length of the sequence with the inductive hypothesis that
ψ(si) |= J .
If i = 0 then s0 ∈ Sinit by assumption. Therefore, ψ(s0) |= init by A1. We know by LI1 that ` init→ J . Therefore,
ψ(s0) |= J by Modus Ponens and the soundness of the dL proof calculus.
Now, suppose i > 0. We know ψ(si) |= J by induction. Furthermore, we know T (si, ai, si+1) 6= 0 because otherwise
this trajectory could not exist. By A2 and the denotation of the ; operator, we know (ψ(si), ψ(si+1)) ∈ Jctrl; plantK. By
LI3, we know ` J → [ctrl; plant]J Therefore, ψ(si) |= J and (ψ(si), ψ(si+1)) ∈ Jctrl; plantK implies ψ(si + 1) |= J
by the denotation of the box modality and the soundness of dL.
We have now established that ψ(si) |= J for all i ≥ 0. By LI2, Modus Ponens, and soundness of the dL proof calculus,
we finally conclude that ψ(si) |= safe.
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Note that if all actions ai along the trajectory are generated using Algorithm 1, and if the model is accurate, then the
two assumptions in Theorem 1 will hold.
C Proof of Theorem 2
In order to enforce safety, we wrap the original environment in a new one which has no unsafe actions. By not modifying
the agent or training algorithm, any theoretical results (e.g. convergence) which the algorithm already has will still apply
in our safety-wrapped environment. However, it is still necessary to show the relation between the (optimal) policies
that may be found in the safe environment and the policies in the original environment. We show that 1) all safe policies
in the original environment have the same transition probabilities and expected rewards in the wrapped environment
and 2) all policies in the wrapped environment correspond to a policy in the original environment which has the same
transition probabilities and expected rewards. This shows that the optimal policies in the wrapped environment are
optimal among safe policies in the original environment (so no reward is lost except where required by safety).
Let the original environment be the MDP E = (S,A, T,R). We define a safety checker C : S ×A → {T, F} to be a
predicate such that C(s, a) is True iff action a is safe in state s in E. When we refer to an action as safe or unsafe, we
always mean in the original environment E. A policy pi in E is safe iff
∀s ∈ S ∀a ∈ A pi(a|s) > 0 =⇒ C(s, a).
The safety-wrapped environment will beE′ = (S,A, T ′, R′) where the transition and reward functions will be modified
to ensure there are no unsafe actions and expected rewards in E′ correspond with those from acting safely in E.
T ′ is required to prevent the agent from taking unsafe actions; for any safe action, we keep this identical to T . When an
unsafe action is attempted, we could either take a particular safe action deterministically (perhaps shared across states,
if some action is always safe, or a state-specific safe action) or sample (probably uniformly) from the safe actions in a
given state. We prefer the latter approach of sampling from the safe actions because this makes taking an unsafe action
have higher variance, so the agent will probably learn to avoid such actions. If unsafe actions are deterministically
mapped to some safe action(s), they become indistinguishable, so the agent has no reason to avoid unsafe actions
(unless we tamper with the reward function). Thus we set
T ′(s, a, s′) =
{
T (s, a, s′) if C(s, a)
1
|AC(s)|
∑
a′∈AC(s) T (s, a
′, s′) otherwise
where AC(s) = {a ∈ A | C(s, a)} is the set of safe actions in state s. This simulates replacing unsafe actions with a
safe action chosen uniformly at random.
R′ is defined similarly so that it simulates the reward achieved by replacing unsafe actions with safe ones uniformly at
random:
R′(s, a) =
{
R(s, a) if C(s, a)
1
|AC(s)|
∑
a′∈AC(s) R(s, a
′) otherwise .
Lemma 1. For every safe policy pi in E, following that policy in E′ leads to the same transitions with the same
probabilities and gives the same expected rewards.
Proof. By definition of safety, pi has zero probability for any (s, a) where C(s, a) isn’t true. Thus actions sampled
from pi lead to transitions and rewards from the branch of T ′ and R′ where they are identical to T and R.
Lemma 2. For every policy pi′ in E′ there exists a safe policy pi in E such that pi′ has the same transition probabilities
and expected rewards in E′ as pi does in E.
Proof. For any pi′ in E′, let g(pi′) = pi be defined such that
pi(a|s) =
{
pi′(a|s) + 1|AC(s)|
∑
a′∈AC(s) pi
′(a′|s) if C(s, a)
0 otherwise
where AC(s) = {a ∈ A | ¬C(s, a)} is the set of unsafe actions in state s. This simulates evenly redistributing the the
probability that pi′ assigns to unsafe actions in s among the safe actions.
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We show first that the transition probabilities of pi in E and pi′ in E′ are the same.
Ppi,E(s
′|s) =
∑
a∈A
pi(a|s)T (s, a, s′)
=
∑
a∈AC(s)
pi(a|s)T (s, a, s′) +
∑
a∈AC(s)
pi(a|s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
T (s, a, s′)
=
∑
a∈AC(s)
pi′(a|s) + 1|AC(s)| ∑
a′∈AC(s)
pi′(s, a′)
T (s, a, s′)
=
∑
a∈AC(s)
pi′(a|s)T (s, a, s′) +
∑
a′∈AC(s)
pi′(s, a′)
1
|AC(s)|
 ∑
a∈AC(s)
T (s, a, s′)

=
∑
a∈AC(s)
pi′(a|s)T ′(s, a, s′) +
∑
a∈AC(s)
pi′(a|s) 1|AC(s)|
 ∑
a′∈AC(s)
T (s, a′, s′)

=
∑
a∈AC(s)
pi′(a|s)T ′(s, a, s′) +
∑
a∈AC(s)
pi′(a|s)T ′(s, a, s′)
=
∑
a∈A
pi′(a|s)T ′(s, a, s′)
= Ppi′,E′(s
′|s)
Let Epi,E [Rs] be the expected reward of following the policy pi in environmentE at state s. The equality of the expected
reward for pi in every state of E and pi′ in every state of E′ can be shown similarly:
Epi,E [Rs] =
∑
a∈A
pi(a|s)R(s, a)
=
∑
a∈A
R(s, a)
{
pi′(a|s) + 1|AC(s)|
∑
a′∈AC(s) pi
′(a′|s) if C(s, a)
0 otherwise
=
∑
a∈AC(s)
R(s, a)
pi′(a|s) + 1|AC(s)| ∑
a′∈AC(s)
pi′(a′|s)

=
 ∑
a∈AC(s)
pi′(a|s)R(s, a)
+
 1
|AC(s)|
∑
a′∈AC(s)
pi′(a′|s)
 ∑
a∈AC(s)
R(s, a)
Epi′,E′ [R′s] =
∑
a∈A
pi′(a|s)R′(s, a)
=
∑
a∈A
pi′(a|s)
{
R(s, a) if C(s, a)
1
|AC(s)|
∑
a′∈AC(s) R(s, a
′) otherwise
=
 ∑
a∈AC(s)
pi′(a|s)R(s, a)
+
 1
|AC(s)|
∑
a′∈AC(s)
R(s, a′)
 ∑
a∈AC(s)
pi′(a|s)
= Epi,E [Rs]
Theorem 2. Let E be an environment and L a reinforcement learning algorithm. If L converges to a reward-optimal
policy pi∗ in E, then using Algorithm 1 with L converges to pi∗s , the safe policy with the highest reward (i.e. the
reward-optimal safe policy).
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Proof. We provide proof by contraposition. Let’s assume that pi∗ is not optimal in E′. Then there must exist pi′ in E′
that gets more reward. But, by Lemma 2, pi′ corresponds to a safe policy pi = g(pi′) in E which gets the same amount
of reward, so pi is better in E than pi∗. Hence, pi∗ is not optimal among safe policies in E.
A few notes regarding this theorem:
• The intuitive approach to making an agent safe, if we know the set of safe actions in each state, might be
to sample from the safe subset of the agent’s policy distribution (after renormalization). Because this is not
actually sampling from the distribution the agent learned, this may interfere with training the agent.
• While we keep S the same in E and E′, there may be states which become unreachable in E′ because only
unsafe transitions in E lead to them. Thus the effective size of E′’s state space may be smaller which could
speed up learning effective safe policies.
• Our approach can be viewed as transforming a constrained optimization problem (being safe in E; have to
treat it as a CMDP) into an unconstrained one (being safe in E′).
D Object Detection Details
CenterNet (Zhou et al., 2019) CenterNet-style object detectors take an image of sizeH×W ×C (height, width, and
channels, respectively) as input and output an image Z of size bH/Sc × bW/Sc × (N + 2) where S is a downscaling
amount to make the detection more efficient and N is the number of classes to detect. For the first N channels, zijk
is the probability that the pixel i, j is the (downscaled) center of an object of the kth class. The final two channels
of Z contain x and y offsets. The offsets account for the error in detecting locations in the original image because
the predictions are downscaled: a downscaled detection at i, j can be converted to a detection in the original image
coordinates at i′, j′ by setting i′ = i ∗ S + o1, j′ = j ∗ S + o2 where o1 = zijN , o2 = zij(N+1). As the objects in our
environments have constant sizes, we don’t predict the object sizes as is done in CenterNet.
As in Zhou et al. (2019), we set S = 4 and use max-pooling and thresholding to convert from the probability
maps to a list of detections. In particular, there is a detection for object class k at location i, j if zijk ≥ τ and
zijk == maxpool(zijk) where maxpool is a 3x3 max-pooling operation centered at i, j (with zero-padding). We set
τ = 0.5. The detector then returns a list of tuples (k, i′, j′) containing the class id (k) and center point (i′, j′) of each
detection. These are used in evaluating the constraints wherever the formulas reference the location of an object of type
k (i.e. if a robot must avoid hazards, the constraint will be checked using the location of each hazard in the detections
list).
We use ResNet-18 (He et al., 2016) truncated to the end of the first residual block. The first layer is also modified
to have only a single input channel because we use grayscale images, as is common for inputs to RL agents. This
already outputs an image which is downscaled 4x relative to the input, so we do the centerpoint classification and offset
prediction directly from this image, removing the need for upscaling. We use one 1x1 convolutional layer for the offset
prediction (two output channels) and one for the center point classification (N output channels and sigmoid activation).
Training To avoid introducing a dependency on heavy annotations, we restricted ourselves to a single image for
each safety-relevant object in an environment and a background image. We produce images for training by pasting the
objects into random locations in the background image. We also use other standard augmentations such as left-right
flips and rotations. New images are generated for every batch.
We use the label-generation and loss function from Zhou et al. (2019). Labels for each object class are generated by
evaluating, at each pixel position, a Gaussian density on the distance from that position to the center of the nearest
object of the given class (see Algorithm 2 for details).
The loss function is a focal loss: a variant of cross-entropy that focuses more on difficult examples (where the predicted
probabilities are farther from the true probabilities) (Lin et al., 2017). We use a modified focal loss as in (Law & Deng,
2018; Zhou et al., 2019):
−1
N
∑
i,j,k
{
(1− Yˆijk)α log(Yˆijk) if Yijk = 1
(1− Yijk)βYˆ αijk log(1− Yˆijk) otherwise
where N is the number of objects in the image (of any type); i ∈ [1, h]; j ∈ [1, w]; t ∈ [1, T ]; w, h are the width and
height of the image; and T is the number of object classes. Yˆijk is the predicted probability of an object of type t being
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Algorithm 2 Label Creation
Input xs, ys: center x, y positions for each object of a type; h,w: label image height, width
Y ← 0h×w // an array of zeros of size h× w
Σ←
[
h/2 0
0 w/2
]
for x ∈ xs, y ∈ ys do
µ← [x, y]
for i←1, 2, . . . , h do
for j←1, 2, . . . , w do
// φµ,Σ is the probability density of a multivariate Gaussian parametrized by µ and Σ
Yij ← max(Yij , φµ,Σ([i, j]))
return Y
centered at position (x, y) in the image and Yijk is the “true” probability. α, β are hyperparameters that we set to 2 and
4, respectively, as done by (Law & Deng, 2018; Zhou et al., 2019). We remove the division by N if an image has no
objects present. The loss for the offsets is mean-squared error, and we weight the focal loss and offset loss equally.
We use the Adam optimizer (Kingma & Ba, 2014) with learning rate 0.000125, beta1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999, as in Zhou
et al. (2019). We decrease the learning rate by a factor of 10 if the loss on a validation set of 5,000 new images doesn’t
improve within 10 training epochs of 20,000 images. The batch size is 32 as in Zhou et al. (2019). We keep the model
which had the best validation loss.
E Reinforcement Learning Details
In all of our experiments, we use PPO as the reinforcement learning algorithm. Our hyperparameter settings are listed
in Table 2. We run several environments in parallel to increase training efficiency using the method and implementation
from (Stooke & Abbeel, 2019).
We use grayscale images as inputs to the RL agent, and the CNN architecture from Espeholt et al. (2018).
Hyperparameter Value
Adam learning rate 0.001× α
Num. epochs 4
Number of actors 32
Horizon (T) 64
Minibatch size 2048 (= 32× 64)
Discount (γ) 0.99
GAE parameter (λ) 0.98
Clipping parameter 0.1× α
Value function coeff. 1
Entropy coeff. 0.01
Gradient norm clip 1
Table 2: Hyperparameters used for PPO in all experiments. α is linearly annealed from 1 at the start of each experiment
to 0 at the end.
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